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Introduction 
 
The relationship between multinational enterprises’ (MNE) headquarters and their 
subsidiaries has been of considerable interest to international business scholars (e.g., 
Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2009). Although a subsidiary is an integral part of an MNE, its 
interests do not necessarily converge with those of headquarters. Many scholars note that 
relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries are characterized by the simultaneous 
presence of cooperation and competition (e.g., Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Otterbeck, 
1981). On the one hand, the subsidiary and its managers are dependent on headquarters’ 
resources to fulfill its mandate. On the other hand, the subsidiary and its managers have their 
own particular goals, which may or may not coincide with the goals of headquarters and its 
managers. Subsidiary managers may also seek to develop the unit’s own sense of identity, 
which may be at variance with that of the MNE (e.g., Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). The 
potential for goal and identity conflict between headquarters and subsidiaries leads to the 
emergence of a mixed-motive relationship between the two units and their managers. A 
mixed-motive relationship generates conflict, but the mere existence of conflict is not 
necessarily detrimental to the relationship (Rahim and Bonoma, 1979). However, the 
emergence of a prolonged conflict and/or its ineffective management may create a 
dysfunctional relationship between the headquarters and the subsidiary.  
 
The traditional assumption in the literature on headquarters-subsidiary relationships is that the 
management of conflict is critically shaped by the distribution of power between headquarters 
and subsidiaries, with headquarters traditionally assumed to hold more power. Nevertheless, 
recent scholarship suggests that subsidiaries can become influential and play powerful roles in 
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the organization (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). Although the construct of power is useful 
and indispensable in explaining how conflict is managed in intra-organizational interactions, 
it has its own set of shortcomings if analyzed solely from a structural point of view. For 
example, the headquarters might possess power but have no interest in exercising it, or it may 
use it selectively based on the personal preferences of the top-level decision makers.  
 
An alternative approach to understanding the dynamics of conflict between headquarters and 
subsidiaries is to look at the interactions between the two units from a micro-behavioral level 
(Das and Kumar, 2011). The micro-behavioral perspective places top-level decision makers at 
the center of the analysis. This approach recognizes the importance of the individual level of 
analysis by incorporating the wishes and aspirations of the manager. Relationships between 
headquarters and subsidiaries are managed by individuals operating in a given organizational 
context. While the organizational context is undoubtedly important, but so are the 
psychological predispositions of headquarters and subsidiary managers. In this regard, we 
contribute to the international business literature by emphasizing the role of individuals and, 
in particular, their psychological predispositions in shaping how conflicts evolve and are 
managed by headquarters and subsidiary managers (e.g., Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011; 
Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009; Powell, Lovallo, and Fox, 2011).  
 
We integrate this perspective with the legitimacy literature (e.g., Kostova and Roth, 2002; 
Suchman, 1995), with an emphasis on internal legitimacy. The aim is to describe the process 
of legitimization and how conflicts escalate into legitimacy crises. In line with Drori and 
Honig (2013), we examine the processes through which internal legitimacy originates, 
develops, and is maintained at different organizational levels. This area remains 
underdeveloped in the international business literature (e.g., Kumar, 2016; Kumar and Das, 
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2007). Legitimacy is important for understanding the relations between MNE headquarters 
and their subsidiaries because it determines the degree to which the actors are inclined to 
cooperate with each other (Kumar and Das, 2007). Given that an MNE and its subsidiary may 
not have congruent goals, the ability to cooperate is key. This ability is dependent on the 
inter-partner legitimacy between them (Kumar and Das, 2007). 
   
We integrate the legitimacy perspective with the regulatory focus orientation of headquarters 
and subsidiary managers. This is important because headquarters and subsidiary managers 
may differ in their psychological predispositions and in how they construe different situations. 
These factors may affect their perceptions and behavior, and determine whether legitimacy 
crises will arise. We draw upon regulatory focus theory in suggesting that managers are either 
promotion oriented and focused on maximizing positive outcomes, or prevention-oriented and 
focused on minimizing losses. Differences in the regulatory foci of headquarters and 
subsidiary managers produce conflicts that lead to legitimacy crises. Whether these crises 
escalate or are resolved depends on the types of power utilized by the respective managers.   
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we integrate the micro level of analysis with 
the macro level by bringing back the individual. The psychological predispositions of 
managers in headquarters and subsidiaries are crucial, as is the organizational context within 
which those managers make decisions. Second, we develop a process-based explanation of 
how interactions might develop between headquarters and subsidiary managers, and the kinds 
of legitimacy crises that these relationships might encounter. This frame that has rarely, if 
ever, been utilized in explaining the relational dynamics between headquarters and 
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subsidiaries. Third, in analyzing the micro dynamics of intra-organizational actions within an 
organizational context, the paper sheds light on the crucial issue of the management of the 
relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries in practice.  
 
We begin by reviewing the nature of legitimacy, especially the intra-organizational and 
internal legitimacy dynamics. We then review the notions of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998, 
2000) and organizational power (Lukes, 2005). Thereafter, we demonstrate how strategic 
interactions proceed between the MNE and the subsidiary. We develop propositions before 
we conclude by discussing the theoretical and managerial implications of the framework 
advanced here.   
 
Literature Review 
 
The nature of legitimacy 
Suchman (1995: 576) notes that legitimacy is significant for understanding ‘how the 
organization is built, how it is run, and simultaneously how it is understood and evaluated.’ A 
key corollary is that legitimacy provides the underpinnings for understanding how 
organizations function in practice. Suchman (1995: 574) defines legitimacy as a ‘generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, appropriate, or proper 
within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs, and definition.’ Scholars note that 
legitimacy exists on a continuum (Kumar and Das, 2007) and that ‘a unanimous agreement of 
all parties is not necessary for legitimacy to exist’ (Kumar and Das, 2007: 1427). Much of the 
existing research on MNE legitimacy focuses on external legitimacy and how an enterprise 
gains acceptance from external stakeholders, especially the various actors in the host country 
in which the subsidiary is operating (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). However, internal 
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legitimacy may be just as important for an MNE as external legitimacy. If the MNE is to 
function well, the headquarters and its subsidiaries must cooperate well with each other.  
 
Scholars note that relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries are often rife with 
tension (e.g., Kostova, Marano, and Tallman, 2016), as there is always the possibility that the 
headquarters or the subsidiary might behave opportunistically (e.g., Mudambi and Navarro, 
2004). Attainment of internal legitimacy obviates this problem. We follow Drori and Honig 
(2016: 347) in defining internal legitimacy ‘as the acceptance or normative validation of an 
organizational strategy through the consensus of its participants, which acts as a tool that 
reinforces organizational practices and mobilizes organizational members around a common 
ethical, strategic, or ideological vision.’ These authors also argue that internal legitimacy 
provides the much needed motivation for the actors to engage in cooperative behavior. 
Furthermore, as outlined by Kumar and Nti (1998), internal legitimacy may enhance 
cooperative behavior by strengthening psychological attachments among actors. A third 
argument, provided by Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter (2000), is that internal legitimacy induces 
actors to resolve conflicts in an integrative, rather than a distributive, way. Finally, internal 
legitimacy is likely to strengthen the reputation of the subsidiary as a desirable partner 
(Kumar and Das, 2007). 
   
Suchman (1995) notes that there are two types of internal legitimacy: pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is dependent on ‘the self-interested calculations of an 
organization's most immediate audiences’ (Suchman, 1995: 578). On the basis of Suchman’s 
framework, we can view the headquarters and the subsidiary as each other’s constituencies. In 
this regard, we can analyze whether, for example, the subsidiary views the policies of the 
headquarters as facilitating direct or indirect benefits for the subsidiary, such that the policies 
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are viewed as responsive to the subsidiary’s larger interests. We can also investigate whether 
the subsidiary believes that the headquarters unit has some good attributes (e.g., trustworthy, 
decent, or wise; Heidhues and Patel, 2012; Suchman, 1995). As such, pragmatic legitimacy 
crises are associated with obstacles in reaching a desired level of performance. In the presence 
of pragmatic legitimacy, both the subsidiary and the headquarters see the maintenance of a 
cooperative, cordial relationship as advantageous. In other words, both the headquarters and 
the subsidiary recognize that their involvement with each other serves not only their own 
interests but also the interests of the relationship between the headquarters and the subsidiary. 
 
Moral legitimacy is indicative of how favorably or unfavorably the organization is viewed by 
its counterpart (Suchman, 1995). Here, the headquarters’ constituency, (i.e., the subsidiary) 
might believe that the headquarters breaks ‘the rules of the game’ for immoral reasons, and 
vice versa. A favorable or unfavorable judgment is dependent on how the actors evaluate their 
counterpart's behaviors, and does not focus on performance-related issues. If the counterpart 
is viewed as behaving appropriately, then a positive evaluation of moral legitimacy emerges.  
 
We suggest that both pragmatic and moral legitimacy are critical for the relationship between 
the parent company and the subsidiary. Pragmatic legitimacy speaks to the fact that the 
interests of both the actors are being fulfilled, while moral legitimacy is indicative of the fact 
that each actor evaluates the other as behaving appropriately. The latter is critical because it 
provides the critical foundation for a thriving relationship.  
 
Regulatory Focus 
Regulatory focus theory is a theory of motivation that is attracting an increasing amount of 
attention in organizational settings (e.g., Das and Kumar, 2011; Kark and Dijk, 2007; Lanaj, 
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Chang, and Johnson, 2012). The theory has been used to explain leadership behavior (Kark 
and Dijk, 2007), negotiations (Appelt and Higgins, 2010), alliance failure (Das and Kumar, 
2011), the nature of alliance contracts (Weber and Mayer, 2011), expatriate failure (Kumar, 
Budhwar, and Patel, 2014), and internationalization behavior (Li and Gammelgaard, 2014). 
Central to this theory is the recognition that people can engage in self-regulation through 
either a promotion-oriented self-regulatory system or a prevention-oriented self-regulatory 
system. Regulatory focus theory refers to a situation in which a manageri pursues a goal that 
maintains personal values and beliefs, which can be termed regulatory orientation. In this 
context, ‘regulatory’ relates to the fact that managers self-regulate the methods and processes 
involved in regulating affect, cognition, and behavior during their goal pursuit (Gamache et 
al., 2015). In a promotion-oriented self-regulatory system, the emphasis is on satisfying 
nurturance needs. This is best accomplished by seeking to achieve one's goals and aspirations. 
In a prevention-oriented self-regulatory system, the focus is on satisfying security needs, 
which are best met by fulfilling duties and obligations. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The promotion- and prevention-oriented self-regulatory systems differ on a number of 
dimensions (see Table 1). A key point of differentiation is that promotion-oriented managers 
are likely to adopt an eager approach, whereas prevention-oriented managers focus on a 
strategy of vigilance (Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2000). Moreover, promotion-oriented managers 
are more entrepreneurial and experimental, and are more willing to experiment with 
alternative options for achieving their goals. In contrast, prevention-oriented managers prefer 
to safeguard the status quo and are, therefore, less likely to pursue actions that could lead to 
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failure. Bingham and Eisenhardt (2008) note the difference between managers who seek to 
secure the competitive position of the firm by strengthening the linkages between the 
company’s existing resources and its activities, and managers who are more inclined to 
engage in experimentation.  
 
Scholars also draw a distinction between a chronic and a situational regulatory focus (Kart 
and Van Dijk, 2007). The chronic regulatory focus has biological origins and is based on 
preferences formed in early childhood (Gamache et al., 2015). The situational regulatory 
focus is derived from the immediate environment, which can be dynamic and uncertain. In 
such markets, managers are likely to be promotion oriented. Other markets can be stable and 
predictable, and organizations can be bureaucratic and routine-based. In such markets, 
managers can choose to be prevention oriented (Shamir and Howell, 1999). A manager can, 
in fact, be promotion focused but work in an environment that encourages a prevention focus. 
However, the distinction between chronic and situational regulatory focus does not have a 
direct impact on our analysis of interactions between headquarters and subsidiary managers. 
This follows from the fact that the impact of regulatory focus is likely to be the same 
regardless of whether it is a product of chronic or situational factors. Nevertheless, the more 
important factor to consider is whether there is congruence between the chronic focus and the 
situational focus. In the presence of congruence, the impact will be similar and may, indeed, 
be amplified (Shah, Higgins, and Friedman, 1998). In the absence of congruence, much 
depends on whether the chronic or the situational focus is stronger.  
 
Promotion-oriented managers are most likely to accomplish goals and are highly persistent 
(Higgins and Spiegel, 2004). They adopt a transformational, charismatic leadership style 
(Kark and Van Dijk, 2007) with a focus on tasks and performance, and they are concerned 
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about the presence or absence of pragmatic legitimacy (Lanaj et al., 2012). In contrast, 
prevention-oriented managers stress the importance of attaining a minimum level of 
performance and, therefore, adopt a transactional leadership style (Kark and Van Dijk, 2007). 
Their emphasis is on work perceptions and attitudes, and they focus on reducing conflicts 
revolving around moral legitimacy (Lanaj et al., 2012). 
 
This leads to the following propositions: 
P1: The chronic regulatory foci of headquarters and subsidiary managers influence their 
leadership behaviors and strategic decision making. Their situational regulatory focus may 
amplify or dampen the chronic tendencies. Headquarters’ and subsidiary managers’ 
regulatory foci may create a crisis of pragmatic and/or moral legitimacy.  
 
P2: A lack of congruence between headquarters and the subsidiary managers’ chronic and 
situational regulatory foci escalates legitimacy crises. 
 
P3: Promotion-oriented managers at headquarters and subsidiaries employ a 
transformational and entrepreneurial leadership style. They are eager to resolve problems of 
pragmatic legitimacy, but this eagerness might create problems of moral legitimacy. 
 
P4: Prevention-oriented managers in the headquarters and the subsidiary follow a 
monitoring, safe-guarding leadership style. This vigilant management style resolves moral 
legitimacy problems but may create problems of pragmatic legitimacy. 
 
Organizational Power 
We might assume that if the regulatory foci of the headquarters and the subsidiary manager 
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are similar, there might be less conflict. This is not necessarily true given that power in an 
MNE is asymmetrically distributed. The concept of organizational power remains central to 
our analysis. 
 
In the international business literature, the concept of power is associated with Dahl’s (1957) 
seminal contribution, which focuses on actor A’s ability to get actor B to do something that he 
or she would otherwise not do. An MNE is, by definition, a hierarchy, and the headquarters 
formally owns the subsidiaries. Headquarters power refers to the fact that the headquarters 
has ‘intra-organizational supremacy,’ and can therefore command and control the subsidiary. 
Thereby, power becomes explicitly relational and asymmetrical (Lukes, 2005). Furthermore, 
power relates to the headquarters’ ability to constrain subsidiaries in their strategic decision 
making. Headquarters is ‘dominating’ in this regard, as it can affect the subsidiary in ways 
contrary to the subsidiary’s interests (Lukes, 2005). Headquarters has the mandate to both 
reward and sanction (French and Raven, 1959). In many instances, subsidiaries comply more 
because of a threat of sanctions than because of an actual sanction (Whittle et al., 
forthcoming). Consequently, even powerful subsidiaries face the threat of sanctions, as the 
headquarters can decide to solve legitimacy crises through disposal (Clark and Geppert, 2011) 
or by laying off the subsidiary manager (Hardy, 1996). The headquarters may also withdraw 
decision making rights from the subsidiary (Ambos, Asakawa, and Ambos, 2011; Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy, 1999). Given these factors, Diefenbach and Sillince (2011) find that 
hierarchical power seems to be persistent, and that most social systems are based on stable 
hierarchical relationships of superiors and subordinates. We describe this type of headquarters 
power as persistent hierarchical power.   
 
The notion of a hierarchy is central to the description of how power manifests in 
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headquarters-subsidiary relationships. However, Weber (1947) argues that in order to 
establish an enduring and permanent situation of domination, power has to be equated with 
authority. The notion of authority suggests that compliance is achieved when a subsidiary 
accepts the headquarters’ dominance as legitimate because either the content of commands is 
reasonable or the process explaining the content is seen as legitimate (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1963). Subsidiaries can therefore disagree with the goals defined by headquarters but still 
comply with the headquarters’ wishes because the process is viewed as legitimate (Higgins, 
2009). As such, An MNE is an example of a structure of dominance emphasizing compliance 
with certain rules. However, this structure of dominance can be transformed into a structure of 
authority when rules are accepted as a legally rational basis for constraining actions (Clegg, 
Courpasson, and Phillips, 2006). We refer to this power as ‘headquarters’ legitimate 
authority.’  
 
The powers of headquarters, in whatever form, needs to be counterbalanced with the powers 
of subsidiaries. In some cases, headquarters will benefit from delegating power to 
subsidiaries, such as in cases of asymmetric information flows in favor of the subsidiary 
where performance depends on specialized and often tacit knowledge of host-country 
contingencies rather than on insights into global operations (Mudambi, 2011). However, 
utilization of legitimate authority power might lead subsidiaries to acquiesce to headquarters’ 
decisions that may not be productive. On the other hand, the use of persistent hierarchical 
power might cause rent-seeking behavior among subsidiary managers (Mudambi and 
Navarra, 2004). These types of tensions have been referred to as a ‘tug of war’ between the 
‘ownership right’ of headquarters and the ‘control right’ of subsidiaries over strategically 
important resources (Ambos et al., 2011; Foss and Foss, 2005; Mudambi, 2011). In any case, 
even subsidiaries, with delegated forms of power can still find their actions constrained by the 
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fact that they need to avoid a future retraction of authority by headquarters (Baker et al., 
1999). Therefore, the distribution of power between headquarters and subsidiaries is an 
outcome of continuous negotiations (Ambos et al., 2011; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). 
  
The international business literature has investigated a range of situations in which certain 
subsidiary characteristics provide the subsidiary with power. A subsidiary obtains power 
when it possesses certain resources, network positions, or resources needed to capitalize on 
institutional and market conditions (Ferner et al., 2004). In order to be powerful, the 
subsidiary must possess scarce resources upon which the headquarters or the MNE as a whole 
are dependent (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Pfeffer and Salancic, 1978). Alternatively, it 
must control relationships that provide access to resources (Astley and Sachdeva, 1984) that 
are discrete and unique (Medcoff, 2011), and not obtainable through a third party (Ambos et 
al., 2011; Harpaz and Meshoulam, 1997). Furthermore, the ability to reduce critical 
uncertainties related to the environment as well as organizational centrality (e.g., being a 
divisional headquarters; Astley and Sachdeva, 1984) are parts of structural contingency power 
(Harpaz and Meshoulam, 1997).  
 
All of these types of power can place the headquarters in a vulnerable situation if they are 
utilized by the subsidiary. Consequently, these types of power are typically used to challenge 
the organization’s status quo (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008), which leads us to refer to them 
as ‘subsidiary rebellion power.’ The term highlights situations in which resource-dependency 
power is only associated with the right of control, while the ownership right is still the 
prominent source of power (Ambos et al., 2011; Anand, 2011). Therefore, in the 
aforementioned ‘tug of war,’ headquarters will recentralize strategic mandates when the 
benefits of doing so outweigh the disadvantages of vulnerability. Headquarters might also 
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have an interest in restricting the most powerful subsidiaries if the risk of opportunistic rent 
seeking is assumed to be too high (Mudambi, 2011) and headquarters managers might find 
themselves in a situation in which they cannot exercise top-down decisions (Anand, 2011; 
Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). Such situations arise when subsidiary managers develop into 
‘autonomous barons’ and headquarters managers only can initiate changes supported by the 
subsidiary manager (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). 
  
However, subsidiaries might wish to maintain the status quo when headquarters wishes to use  
its powers. In that situation, the issue is the degree to which the subsidiary can resist (Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw, 2008; Erkama and Vaara, 2010), defy (Sandvik, 2010), operate 
autonomously outside the range of headquarters’ orders (Fritz and Karlsson, 2006), or use 
politics to transform headquarters’ strategic intentions into strategic inaction (Whittle et al., 
forthcoming). Resistance is associated with power—the latter can be defined as the ability to 
implement one’s will despite the resistance of others (Lukes, 2005). Therefore, resistance is 
not a direct expression of power but rather an obstacle for other actors wishing to realize their 
will. Consequently, in the power literature, resistance is associated with low-power actors, as 
they can only resist (i.e., minimize the effects of ‘punishment’) but not change a situation.ii 
Schotter and Beamish (2011) recognize subsidiary resistance as a common phenomenon that 
is not necessarily dysfunctional. The literature outlines reasons for the use of this type of 
power, such as the ability to bargain (e.g., using issue-selling techniques; Erkama and Vaara, 
2010). In this paper, we refer to this type of power as ‘subsidiary resistance power.’  
 
Regulatory focus and its link to organizational power 
Headquarters managers who are promotion-oriented will induce the organization to enter new 
domains and thereby accelerate its rate of growth. They will work towards achieving their 
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aspirations and they will be eager to initiate changes. According to Kark and Van Dijk (2007), 
promotion-oriented managers use emotion as a mechanism for leadership behaviors. In this 
manner of motivation, managers lead because they like to lead others and they aim to achieve 
power. We propose that such managers will make use of all available ‘strategic instruments,’ 
such as rewards and sanctions, to achieve their ambitions, and that they will have a tendency 
to use persistent hierarchical power. 
 
Prevention-oriented headquarters managers, in contrast, will avoid any negative outcomes, as 
they are concerned about organizational survival. They will work to avoid any type of conflict 
and they will be willing to negotiate with subsidiaries to arrive at a mutually acceptable 
agreement. Kark and Van Dijk (2007) suggest that these managers have a social normative 
motivation to lead, and that they lead out of a sense of duty and social responsibility. They are 
affected by social pressures, and they like to get subordinates’ acceptance rather than forcing 
them to comply. To achieve this acceptance, they are likely to use legitimized authority 
power.  
 
This discussion leads to the following proposition:  
 
P5: Promotion-oriented managers at headquarters make use of persistent hierarchical power, 
while headquarters’ prevention-oriented managers make use of legitimized authority power. 
 
Promotion-oriented subsidiary managers will have an entrepreneurial mindset and they will 
strive to expand the subsidiary's influence by suggesting a number of initiatives to 
headquarters’ management. In addition, they will establish coalitions and make use of 
political power in order to achieve their ambitions. They are likely to utilize any kind of 
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resource-dependency situation to achieve their ambitions, and are therefore likely to utilize 
rebellion power to challenge headquarters in their domain (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
 
Prevention-oriented subsidiary managers will work to ensure the subsidiary’s status quo. They 
await headquarters’ orders and only react to avoid negative outcomes (e.g., a threat of a 
charter removal). When forced to react, they mobilize local labor unions to resist 
headquarters’ orders (Erkama and Vaara, 2010) or they initiate issue-selling strategies. We 
therefore associate a prevention orientation with resistance power. This argumentation leads 
to the following proposition. 
 
P6: The subsidiary’s promotion-oriented managers achieve their entrepreneurial ambitions 
by utilizing rebellion power based on resource-dependency situations, while the subsidiary’s 
prevention-oriented managers ensure the status quo by delaying headquarters orders based 
on the use of resistance power. 
 
Regulatory focus, organizational power, and the impact on legitimacy crises 
 
In the following sections, we outline the interactional dynamics evident when headquarters 
and subsidiary managers possess similar or different regulatory foci. There are four possible 
scenarios: (a) the headquarters manager and the subsidiary manager are both promotion 
oriented; (b) the headquarters manager is prevention oriented and the subsidiary manager is 
promotion oriented (c) the headquarters manager is promotion oriented and the subsidiary 
manager is prevention oriented; and (d) both managers are prevention oriented. Table 2 
outlines the relationships between regulatory focus and types of organizational power, as 
outlined in propositions 5 and 6. Figure 1 outlines how interactions between managers can 
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create tension and legitimacy crises, and shows how the use of powers can escalate or resolve 
legitimacy crises. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
Promotion-oriented headquarters manager and promotion-oriented subsidiary manager 
 
In this scenario, the regulatory focus of both managers means that they will be proactive and 
eager. They will use aggressive influence tactics to sell their position to their counterparts. 
The use of persistent hierarchical power clashes with the use of rebellion power and is likely 
to lead to conflict escalation. Pragmatic legitimacy crises can occur, especially in cases with 
different opinions of which goals to pursue (Suchman, 1995). This situation will be further 
escalated by a lack of congruence between chronic and situational focus. Furthermore, a clash 
between persistent hierarchical power and rebellion power may call the moral legitimacy of 
the partnership into question, which can be exacerbated by the fact that managers may engage 
in acts of passive opportunism (Das and Kumar, 2011). Whether this occurs depends on how 
carefully and/or skillfully the partners are able to deploy hierarchical and rebellion power.  
 
An example of this scenario is in found Fritz and Karlsson’s (2006) description of the 
Swedish multinational SKF. SKF was a world leader in the ball-bearings industry. 
Throughout the twentieth century, its subsidiaries were highly autonomous and powerful. The 
subsidiary managers acted as ‘little kings’ with no manifest desire to coordinate with 
headquarters (Fritz and Karlsson, 2006: 196-199). When Japanese companies moved to enter 
the west European markets, SKF’s Swedish headquarters called for a group meeting with the 
four most-important subsidiaries. The objective was to rationalize programs and centralize 
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decision-making power. However, headquarters could not enforce its will. The subsidiary 
managers engaged in rent seeking, thereby creating a moral legitimacy crisis. The situation 
did not improve until the subsidiary managers were replaced. 
 
Based on the above line of argumentation, we postulate: 
Proposition 7(a): If both headquarters and subsidiary managers are promotion oriented, they 
are equally motivated to attain and/or reestablish pragmatic legitimacy. However, this 
requires them to reach consensus on goals. 
  
Proposition 7(b): If both headquarters and subsidiary managers are promotion oriented, they 
are likely to utilize aggressive influence tactics, which may threaten the moral legitimacy of 
the partnership. 
 
Promotion 7(c): In both legitimacy-crisis cases, skillful management of power is needed to 
overcome the legitimacy crisis. 
 
Prevention-oriented headquarters manager and promotion-oriented subsidiary manager  
If the headquarters managers are prevention oriented, their main objective is to maintain the 
status quo. They will not initiate new initiatives or respond to initiatives from the subsidiary 
in a positive way, and their strategic approach will be reactive rather than proactive. The 
promotion-oriented subsidiary manager will be frustrated, and the headquarters and the 
subsidiary will find themselves in conflict. Different approaches to dealing with the problem 
will create a crisis of both pragmatic and moral legitimacy. In terms of pragmatic legitimacy, 
the subsidiary managers will feel constrained from realizing their ambitions. This will create a 
problem of pragmatic legitimacy at the subsidiary level, but not from the headquarters’ point 
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of view, as rejection of subsidiary initiatives will not affects the status quo. In terms of moral 
legitimacy, the aggressive initiative-taking approach of the subsidiary, which tries to use its 
resource-dependency power, will be viewed as an instance of norm violation and generate 
negative sentiments among headquarters managers. The subsidiary’s rebellion power will 
clash with headquarters’ legitimized authority. As it does so, a vicious, aggressive, defensive 
cycle may emerge. This may generate new problems, as it worsens the relationship between 
the actors.  
 
Sargent and Matthews (2006) investigate cases of Mexican maquiladoras—subsidiary plants 
located along the U.S.-Mexican border. Their role is to import duty-free components, which 
are assembled or manufactured, and then exported to other units of the MNE. Generally, these 
subsidiaries are viewed as possessing low power, but entrepreneurial-oriented subsidiary 
managers can make convincing arguments and get initiatives approved. However, in one of 
the cases, the subsidiary was too proactive, which was not viewed positively by the 
headquarters. This proactive stance generated a moral legitimacy crisis from the standpoint of 
the headquarters. 
 
 This leads to the following propositions.   
 
Proposition 8(a): If the headquarters manager is prevention oriented and the subsidiary 
manager is promotion oriented, they differ in terms of their views on which type of legitimacy 
is the most salient. The promotion-oriented subsidiary manager focuses on pragmatic 
legitimacy, whereas the prevention-oriented headquarters manager focuses on moral 
legitimacy. 
 
18 
 
Legitimacy Dynamics in Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationships 
 
Proposition 8(b): The prevention-oriented headquarters manager is reactive, whereas the 
promotion-oriented manager is proactive, giving rise to crises of both pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy. 
  
Proposition 8(c): The legitimized authority of the headquarters clashes with the subsidiary's 
rebellion power, which may worsen the relationship between the partners. 
 
Promotion-oriented headquarters manager and prevention-oriented subsidiary manager  
In this situation, the headquarters manager will be at the forefront of taking new initiatives 
and will want the subsidiary manager to follow suit. In contrast, the subsidiary manager will 
be very reactive and will not want to comply with the wishes of the headquarters manager. 
For the subsidiary manager, the maintenance of the existing status quo is of primary 
importance, and he or she will not wish to jeopardize that status quo by embarking on new 
initiatives. This is likely to compromise both the pragmatic legitimacy and the moral 
legitimacy of the partnership. The headquarters manager will feel unable to make any 
advancements, as the subsidiary manager will resist proposed changes. This compromises the 
pragmatic legitimacy. The failure of the subsidiary manager to follow the dictates of the 
headquarters will also threaten the moral legitimacy of the partnership, as the subsidiary is not 
seen as behaving in the way that it should. The persistent hierarchical power of the 
headquarters will clash with the resistant power of the subsidiary. The use of both persistent 
hierarchal power and subsidiary resistant power is likely to escalate the conflict. 
 
Whittle et al. (forthcoming: 2) refer to a case in which a subsidiary uses power to resist 
actions by headquarters and turn them into ‘strategic inactions.’ Their findings are based on 
an anonymous case of a British subsidiary of an US MNE. The subsidiary managers see 
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headquarters managers as ‘bad guys’ whom the subsidiary needs to ‘fight against,’ and they 
stress the need to work ‘under the radar’ (Whittle et al., forthcoming: 10). The threat of 
sanctions is real, as subsidiary managers have been sacked because of ‘political battles.’ This 
resulted in vigilant behavior of ‘doing nothing.’ This case illustrates the biggest gap in the 
power asymmetry between headquarters and the subsidiary, as persistent headquarters power 
is opposed by resistant power.  
 
This leads to the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 9(a): If the headquarters manager is promotion oriented and the subsidiary 
manager is prevention oriented, they differ in their view of which type of legitimacy is the 
most salient. The promotion-focused manager at the headquarters level focuses on pragmatic 
legitimacy, whereas the prevention-focused manager at the subsidiary level focuses on moral 
legitimacy. 
  
Proposition 9(b): The promotion-focused manager at the headquarters level is proactive, 
whereas the prevention focused manager at the subsidiary level is reactive, giving rise to a 
crisis of both pragmatic and moral legitimacy. 
 
Proposition 9(c): Hierarchical power held by the headquarters clashes with the subsidiary's 
resistant power, which may worsen the relationship between the partners.  
 
Prevention-oriented headquarters manager and prevention-oriented subsidiary 
manager  
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This is the one instance in which the conflict between the headquarters and the subsidiaries 
may be minimal. Both actors are interested in maintaining the status quo, and their strategic 
approach may be congruent. Both actors are likely to be reactive and to avoid actions that 
might threaten their counterpart. Although reactivity rules, which may secure moral 
legitimacy, it may also call the pragmatic legitimacy of the partnership into question. This 
occurs because the actors are either not inclined or not able to undertake actions that may 
enhance performance in response to changes in market competition. The subsidiary's resistant 
power will dovetail with headquarters’ legitimized authority, producing a status quo.  
 
The case of the Toyota accelerator crises serves as a good example of this situation. Toyota’s 
headquarters were heavily criticized for their slow response to the problem and the delay in 
the recall of vehicles for safety reasons. In fact, the problem was well known in both the 
subsidiaries and the headquarters. However, a vigilant approach to problems and the conflict-
avoidance culture common in Japan escalated the issue (Greto, Schotter, and Teagarden, 
2013). Toyota managers have been described as ‘conservative’ with a principle of ‘safety 
first.’ They also strongly believe in legitimized authority (Greto et al. (2010: 3). This is a case 
of prevention-oriented managers working in a promotion-oriented environment, with tight 
competition in a declining automobile market. According to Greto et al. (2010: 7), market 
analysts pointed to ‘Toyota’s unique subsidiary structure as a contribution factor in the recall 
crises,’ and they states that ‘Toyota’s leadership appeared to be in no hurry to address the 
problem.’ In seeking to avoid problems of moral legitimacy, Toyota created a crisis of 
pragmatic legitimacy.  
 
This leads to the following propositions: 
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Proposition 10(a): If the headquarters manager is prevention oriented and the subsidiary 
manager is prevention oriented, their views of which type of legitimacy is most important will 
concur. Both managers focus on moral legitimacy. 
 
Proposition 10(b): Both headquarters and subsidiary managers will be reactive. This will 
avoid the problem of moral legitimacy but create one of pragmatic legitimacy. 
 
Proposition 10(c): Headquarters’ legitimized authority may be in sync with the subsidiary's 
resistant power. 
 
Conclusion 
We demonstrate the presence of interdependent linkages among internal legitimacy, 
regulatory focus, and MNE organizational power. MNEs need to deal with external 
legitimacy, but internal legitimacy crises of a pragmatic or moral character can occur as well, 
and need to be avoided or resolved. This paper suggests that the regulatory foci of 
headquarters and subsidiary managers are likely to lead to different kinds of legitimacy crises 
when these actors interact. Different constellations of regulatory focus give rise to different 
types of legitimacy crises—sometimes pragmatic, sometimes moral, and sometimes both. 
Different types of crises also occur at various organizational levels, such that the type of crisis 
at the headquarters level can be different from the type of crisis at the subsidiary level. 
Furthermore, we propose that different types of organizational power are associated with 
specific regulatory foci. Persistent hierarchical power and subsidiary rebellion power are 
associated with promotion-oriented managers, and legitimized authority and resistant power 
are linked with prevention-oriented managers.  
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The paper contributes to the international business literature in several ways. We integrate the 
micro level with the macro level, which is an uncommon approach in the extant literature. 
The incorporation of managers’ regulatory foci is also novel to this stream of literature.   
 
We also show that different kinds of power are uniquely associated with different regulatory 
foci. This becomes highly relevant when the MNE has to formulate and implement global 
strategies. The headquarters’ ability to define and implement a ‘global strategy’ is, as 
Mudambi (2011) states, affected by the tug of war between ownership and control rights, and 
by the degree to which the subsidiary plays along with, obstructs, or tries to delay such 
decisions.  
 
A theme highly relevant for a global strategy brings us to the second implication of the 
framework presented. Headquarters managers face a variety of psychological profiles among 
subsidiary managers, so interactions with one group of subsidiaries might bring about certain 
types of legitimacy problems, while interactions with another group of subsidiary managers 
might lead to other types of legitimacy problems. This subsidiary-duality problem, which is 
affected by both external and internal legitimacy pressures (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), is 
exaggerated by these managers’ regulatory foci. Some managers will deal with situations in a 
manner consistent with their regulatory focus, while others encounter tension between the 
situational demands and their regulatory focus. This speaks in favor of a high degree of 
differentiation, which Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) suggest will affect decisions regarding 
centralization, formalization, and socialization. 
 
 
The framework has some limitations. As we ignore the role of emotions, one suggestion could 
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be to integrate emotions into the framework (Rozin et al., 1999). External legitimacy 
pressures could be added as well (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). We also neglect the issue of 
group behavior and the impact of headquarters having a management team (in which 
members may have different types of foci). Moreover, we do not consider subsidiary-
subsidiary interactions. In this regard, researchers might wish to investigate the clashes 
between rebellion and resistant power, and between promotion-oriented and prevention-
oriented subsidiary managers. Furthermore, we suggest turning Table 2 around, and 
elaborating on cases in which promotion-oriented managers make use of legitimized authority 
and vice versa for our four scenarios. Finally, we suggest empirically testing the framework 
through interviews and/or experimental simulations.  
 
The paper has important managerial implications. Headquarters and subsidiary managers 
must be sensitive to the internal legitimacy challenges that await them, and they must act in a 
manner that either minimizes the occurrence of these crises and/or respond appropriately 
when they emerge. Headquarters and subsidiaries are in an interdependent relationship, and 
managing internal legitimacy is one of their most important strategic tasks.  
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                                                          Table 1 
Differences between promotion-focused and prevention-focused self-regulatory systems 
 
Motivational Elements Promotion Prevention 
Individual needs Advancements and 
accomplishments 
Security and safety 
Goal focus Reaching positive outcome; +1 
better than 0 
Avoiding negative outcome; 0 
better than -1 
Motivational factors Eagerness, desires, aspirations Vigilance, duties, responsibilities 
Approach Entrepreneurial, errors 
acceptable, positive towards 
changes, work with many 
hypotheses, positive view of 
exchange relationships 
Compliance, errors unacceptable, 
resist changes, work with few 
hypotheses, negative view of 
exchange relationships 
Outcome of legitimacy 
crises 
Redefined scope of power, no 
contextual change, higher effects 
in outcome 
Avoid scope changes, emphasis on 
contextualization, low effects in 
outcome 
 
Based on Das & Kumar, 2011; Webber & Mayer, 2011; Webber et al., 2011. Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2000; 
Liberman et al.,, 1999, 2001  
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Table 2 Relationship between power and regulatory focus 
 
Type of Power Management of Power Managerial Regulatory 
Focus 
Persistent hierarchical 
power 
Through the threat/promise of sanctions/rewards or the 
use of regulation 
Promotion oriented 
Headquarters’ 
legitimized authority 
Through bargaining and persuasion to secure subsidiary 
compliance  
Prevention oriented 
Subsidiary rebellion 
power 
Through utilization of resource-dependency situations to 
secure subsidiary mandate development of individual rent 
seeking 
Promotion oriented 
Subsidiary resistant 
power 
Through issue selling, or politicking and coalition 
making to avoid or delay subsidiary mandate losses 
Prevention oriented 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
  
Headquarters manager 
Promotion or prevention 
Subsidiary manager 
Promotion or prevention 
Headquarters’ persistent 
hierarchical power or  
legitimized authority 
Subsidiary rebellion power or 
resistant power 
Pragmatic and/or moral 
legitimacy crises 
Creation effect Escalating/resolving effect 
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i The psychology literature typical refers to ‘individuals,’ but for the sake of consistency, we use the term 
‘managers.’ 
ii According to Lukes (2005), resistance has been analyzed by such scholars such as James Scott and Friedrich 
Nietsche in relation to slavery, where the slaves could not be liberated from slavery but sometimes had the 
ability (power) to resist the will of and punishment from their masters.  
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